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INTRODUCTION

After many years of effort, Congress actually may amend substantively the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act'-"RICO"-this year.' So I am delighted to accept the
timely invitation of the Vanderbilt Law Review to add my view of how
* The Author is a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in the Chicago office, a
former United States District Court Judge in Chicago 1980-87, and a self-declared member of the
RICO bar. Ms. Getzendanner gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Montgomery K. Fisher,
an associate in Skadden's Washington, D.C. office.
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941, 947-48
(1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
2. See, e.g., Amending RICO, NAT'L J., Oct. 7, 1989, at 2489.
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the law should be revised.
My RICO perspective comes from my years as a federal district
court judge in Chicago from 1980 to 1987, when I witnessed the real
birth and growth of civil RICO.' I am told by my co-panelist, Professor
G. Robert Blakey, that for a time I had written more RICO opinions
than any other judge in the country. (This had nothing to do with my
decision to leave the bench.) As I dealt with these cases, it became clear
to me that most civil RICO cases simply should not be in federal court.
The majority of civil RICO cases involve commonplace commercial controversies, the facts of which reveal an ordinary business relationship
gone sour. These mercantile melees are recharacterized by resourceful
attorneys to conform with the requirements of RICO: adding a few allegations of the use of the mails or wires in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme, describing how the mail or wire fraud offenses form a pattern,
and explaining how the defendants conducted the affairs of an appropriate enterprise. Thus transmogrified, the ordinary state law fraud or
contract action becomes a federal "racketeering" case, threatening
treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Not only is this transformation unfair to the typical commercial defendant, but it also burdens the
dockets of the federal courts and multiplies the legal costs for both
sides in otherwise straightforward litigation.
Civil RICO is not intrinsically evil, however. It was designed to enable private plaintiffs to bring civil actions against persons engaged in a
pattern of criminal activity. This intention is admirable, and RICO has
succeeded in facilitating such civil actions. No one has claimed that the
civil provision of the statute has failed to achieve its goal. The complaint is that civil RICO has succeeded too well.
RICO has become a well-established feature of the legal landscape.
There is a RICO bar, of which I am a member, that brings and defends
civil RICO actions for large corporate clients. The RICO bar is well entrenched, and it will be difficult to dislodge. Moreover, the traditional
plaintiffs' bar and the "consumers' lobbies'"4 also enthusiastically support RICO.
Recognizing the futility of any effort to eliminate or substantially
to narrow civil RICO, I offer a straightforward solution: eliminate mail
3. Although RICO was enacted in 1970, the civil provisions were not used extensively until
the early 1980s. As reported by a RICO task force of the American Bar Association, of approximately 270 trial court decisions between 1970 and 1985, 3% were decided before 1980, 2% in 1980,
7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984. See A.B.A. SECTION OF CORP., BANFING &
Bus. LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CivIL RICO TASK FORCE 55 (1985) [hereinafter ABA RICO
REPORT].

4. See Corrigan, Rolling Back RICO, NAT'L J., Sept. 6, 1986, at 2114, 2116 (stating that RICO
gives "consumers protection against corporate swindles").

1990]

GARDEN VARIETY FRA UD

675

and wire fraud as RICO predicate offenses for civil actions, except in
class actions in which one hundred or more plaintiffs participate. This
simple change will reduce substantially the number of civil RICO cases
and eliminate the "garden variety" fraud and contract disputes that
now find their way into federal court as RICO actions. I also would join
others in excluding securities fraud as a predicate offense for civil
RICO. If the changes I propose are enacted, the piecemeal changes
often urged in the name of RICO reform would become unnecessary.
II. CIVIL RICO:

THE STATUTORY UNDERLAYMENT

RICO is chapter 96, sections 1961 to 1968, of title 18 of the United
States Code. Section 1964(c)5 of the RICO statute provides a private
civil action to recover treble damages, plus costs and attorney's fees, for
injury caused by a violation of section 1962, which prohibits engaging in
or investing the profits from "a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt." "Racketeering activity" is defined in section 1961(1) as any act "chargeable" under several generically described state criminal laws; any act "indictable" under
5. Section 1964(c) states: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
6. Id. § 1962(a). Section 1962 states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer
held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in
any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase
do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the
issuer.
(b)It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
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numerous specific federal criminal offenses-including mail and wire
fraud-and any "offense" involving bankruptcy or securities fraud or
drug-related activities that is "punishable" under federal law.7
A RICO "pattern" is defined in section 1961(5), which says simply
that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."8 The Supreme Court
recently clarified the pattern requirement: "[T]o prove a pattern of
racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat
of continued criminal activity." 9 The Court added, "What a plaintiff or
7. RICO defines "racketeering activity":
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any
act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United State Code:
Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if
the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from
pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions),
section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices), section
1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter),
section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section
1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating
to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954
(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments),
section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activity), sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), section
1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire),
sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children),, [sic] sections 2312 and 2313
(relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in
certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is
indictable under title 29, United State Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from
union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in
the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any
law of the United States, or (E) any act with is indictable under the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act.
Id. § 1961(1).
8. Id. § 1961(5).
9. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989) (citations omitted).
The Court then adopted, for the "relationship" part of its RICO "pattern" definition, the "pat-
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prosecutor must prove is continuity of racketeering activity, or its
threat, simpliciter.This may be done in a variety of ways, thus making
it difficult to formulate in the abstract any general test for
continuity."' 10
Justice Scalia predicted that the lower courts likely would find the
Court's "continuity plus relationship" description of a pattern "about
as helpful to the conduct of their affairs as 'life is a fountain.' ""' I am
not so pessimistic. In the Seventh Circuit, the court early adopted the
view that, like obscenity, you will know a pattern when you see one. 2
After analyzing patterns in a number of cases,'" I found identifying patterns a relatively easy, low-risk task.
III. THE USE

OF

CIvR RICO

Everyone who has examined the legislative history of RICO, with
the exception of Professor G. Robert Blakey, has pointed out that Congress added the private civil treble damages remedy to RICO with virtern" definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988): "[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events." H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2901.
10. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2901. "Continuity" is both a closed- and open-ended concept,
referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature
projects into the future with a threat of repetition. It is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept-and particularly so in the RICO context, where what must be continuous, RICO's predicate
acts or offenses, and the relationship these predicates must bear one to another, are distinct requirements. Id. at 2902.
11. Id. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12. See Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 977 (7th Cir. 1986). Despite the angst of
some commentators and members of the judiciary, as exemplified by Justice Antonin Scalia's concurrence in H.J. Inc., none of the proposed bills to reform RICO attempts to redefine "pattern."
13. See United States v. Roth, No. 85-CR-763 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 17, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); United States v. Roth, No. 85-CR-763 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Radionic Indus., Inc. v. GTE Prods. Corp., 665 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Il1. 1987);
Levit v. Brodner, No. 85-C-7196 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Heritage Ins. Co. of Am. v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 84-C-8747 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 22, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Armetta v. Hess, No. 85-C-4688 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Bachmeier v. Bank of Ravenswood, 663 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Techreations, Inc.
v. National Safety Council, 650 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Edward George Co. v. Buck Stoves
N.W., Inc., No. 85-C-10548 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Gault v.
Foster, No. 83-C-1688 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Medical Emergency Serv. Assoc. v. Foulke, 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Fagenholz v. A.M.F. Inc., No. 85-C3456 (N.D. 111.Dec. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Fye v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 85-C0700 (N.D. Inl. Dec. 3, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp.
222 (N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. II1. 1985);
United States v. Novack, No. 85-CR-26 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, No. 82-C-5279 (N.D. III. July 6, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Kosch v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co., No. 83-C-4832 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 1984) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); States Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Bond Agency, Inc., No. 83-C-285 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 2, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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tually no consideration of its purpose or consequences. 4 After its
enactment, civil RICO percolated for several years before coming to life,
not as a complement to the criminal actions pursued by prosecutors
against nefarious evildoers, but as "a tool for everyday fraud cases
brought against 'respected and legitimate "enterprises."' " 15 In Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.'6 the Second Circuit attempted to limit the
reach of civil RICO by requiring the plaintiff to allege that the defendant had been convicted of either a RICO violation or the predicate acts
upon which the RICO claim was based, and that the injury was caused
by an activity which RICO was designed to deter.'"
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "RICO is to be read
broadly""' as "an aggressive initiative to supplement old remedies and
develop new methods for fighting crime.' 9 The Court steadfastly refused to place any limits on the use of civil RICO against those perceived to be "respected and legitimate 'enterprises.' "20 The Court
acknowledged that "private civil actions under the statute are being
brought almost solely against such defendants, rather than against the
archetypal, intimidating mobster." The Court, however, declined to
remedy the statute. "Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the
statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress."' 21 Defect
it is, and appropriate Congressional correction is clearly necessary.
IV.

REFORM OF THE CivIL

RICO

PREDICATE OFFENSES

Civil RICO cases can be divided into two broad categories: fraud
and all others. The vast majority of civil RICO cases use mail, wire, or
securities fraud as the predicate offense.2 2 In the past two years I have
14. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-88 (1985); County of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that "[w]ith almost no
legislative debate or comment, [RICO] was extended as an afterthought to civil cases to encourage
private suits as a supplement to the efforts of federal law enforcement agencies"); ABA RICO
REPORT, supra note 3, at 112-20.
15. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex. Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
16. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
17. Id. at 495-502.
18. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
19. Id. at 498.
20. Id. at 499. The Court stated:
Yet Congress wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. The former
enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences. The fact that § 1964(c) is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a
pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming
that the provision is being misconstrued.

Id.
21.
22.

Id. at 499.
See ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 3, at 57.
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drafted eight civil RICO complaints. Each involved a single commercial
transaction (frequently a deal that "went south"), corporate parties,
and a great deal of money. The predicate acts were always mail or wire
fraud. The pattern was the most difficult RICO pleading requirement,
but I met that requirement in most of these draft complaints. Under
my proposed amendment of civil RICO, not one of these complaints
could have been drafted.
A.

"Garden Variety Fraud"

Virtually every published case of which I am aware, in which the
RICO claims were predicated exclusively on mail or wire fraud, concerns a commercial dispute to which the attorney has added unremarkable fraud allegations. Some recent examples include the following:
- A foreign participant in a joint venture sued its domestic partner
when it became convinced that its partner was overstating its expenses
23
and thereby collecting more than its fair share of the venture's profits.
- Several businesses brought an action against a bank for charging
a higher rate of interest than stated in the loan agreements.24
- An insurance purchaser sued the insurance agent when the
agent's insurance company became insolvent and failed to pay its
25
claims.
- Oil suppliers brought an action against a purchaser after supplying oil to the purchaser far in excess of the purchaser's credit limit.26
- Investors in a tax shelter scheme who subsequently suffered both
actual losses and loss of expected tax benefits sued the orchestraters of
the scheme.
- A savings and loan sued its former president-chief executive officer, who, it alleged, "solicited and received kickbacks from [Sun's]
'28
customers for whom he approved large loans. "
- State tax collectors sued to recover treble damages-that is, treb29
led taxes-for the filing of inaccurate state tax returns.
- A seller sued a buyer who had an agreement to purchase all of the
seller's stock but terminated the agreement after completing due
23. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483-84.
24. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
473 U.S. 606 (1985).
25. Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 741-42 (5th Cir.
1989).
26. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989).
27. Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1293-95, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (limiting RICO recovery to trebled actual, not expectation, damages).
28. Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1987).
29. Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985).
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diligence.3 0
In these cases, the disputes grew out of business matters or relationships, and in most of the cases the plaintiffs also had state remedies
which they were pursuing simultaneously in the RICO case. Because
treble damages and attorney's fees are available when a RICO claim
succeeds, however, the plaintiffs' lawyers add RICO claims to complaints and go to federal court whenever possible; indeed, it has been
suggested that not doing so could be legal malpractice.3 1
The mail and wire fraud statutes enable the federal government to
prosecute virtually anyone who uses either of these ubiquitous means in
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.32 Other than via RICO, there is no
33
federal private cause of action for the victims of mail and wire fraud.
By allowing only government prosecution under the mail and wire fraud
statutes, Congress limited their application. Prosecutorial discretion
and limited resources combine to restrict the number of cases brought
under the statutes. Civil RICO bypasses these limitations by providing
a private cause of action for mail and wire fraud. Some RICO practitioners argue that the requirement under civil RICO that all of the elements of the mail and wire fraud offenses be met for each predicate
act3 4 allows for considerable judicial "pruning" of the multitude of "garden variety fraud" cases that plaintiffs endeavor to bring. 5 This judicial "pruning" does not happen. The plaintiffs in these "garden variety
fraud" cases do not need treble damages as encouragement and, moreover, most of these cases have no place in federal court. The disputes
are nothing more than commercial disagreements, well suited to resolu30. Metropolitan Int'l, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 657 F. Supp. 627, 629 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
31. See, e.g., Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdictionand Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 5, 10 (1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institution's Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989) (stating that "[a]ny good lawyer who can bring himself within
the terms of the federal civil RICO provisions will sue in federal court because of the prospect of
treble damages and attorney's fees which civil RICO holds out"); Note, Clarifying a "Pattern"of
Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1745, 1770 (1988) (stating that "[i]ndeed, it is so easy and tempting to allege a RICO claim that
counsel may commit malpractice if a RICO claim is not made when the section 1962 statutory
elements have been satisfied").
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud).
33. See Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1979) (mail fraud); Bell v. HealthMor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (mail fraud); Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974) (wire fraud), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975);
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.) (mail fraud), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Milburn v. Blackfrica Promotions, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 434, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (mail fraud).
34. See generally Buffone, Civil RICO: The Use of Mail and Wire FraudAs Predicate Of-

fenses, 1989 RICO

LITIGATION UPDATE

389.

35. See Best & Paull, Stopping Civil RICO at the Garden Gate: The Judicial Pruning of
Mail and Wire Fraud As Predicate Offenses, 1988 RICO LITIGATION UPDATE 333.
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tion under state laws in state court6.
The ease with which plaintiffs can recast ordinary state fraud complaints as RICO allegations also skews the balance developed under
state law and gives RICO plaintiffs a super-plaintiff status. For example, RICO makes it easier to bring a state court fraud case in federal
court by providing RICO plaintiffs with an easier burden of proof than
in state court. An allegation of common-law fraud requires proof by
"clear and convincing" evidence,3 6 because of the moral stigma that society attaches to such a determination.3 7 The federal courts, however,
consistently have rejected a more stringent burden of proof than "preponderance of the evidence" in RICO actions predicated on fraud
38
claims.

Excising mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses generally would
remove these cases from federal court and would eliminate the superplaintiff status that RICO accords fraud plaintiffs. This deletion would
cure the primary misuse of RICO.
B. Multiple Victims
There are those, however, who see RICO as a salutary statute that
laudably facilitates federal civil actions by the victims of fraud, and
who for that reason would object to the deletion of mail and wire fraud
as predicate offenses for civil RICO actions.39 1 would meet these objections by maintaining mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses in cases
involving one hundred or more victims. Litigants and attorneys should
be encouraged to pursue litigation in fraud cases in which there are a
large number of dispersed victims, because absent collective action and
treble damages, each victim has insufficient incentive to sue. The full
panoply of civil RICO predicate offenses should therefore remain avail36. See 9 J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§ 2498, at 424 & n.13

(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981 & Supp. 1989).
37. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (stating that "[t]he interests at
stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously
by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof"); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 178
(1943) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that "fraud, which involves personal moral obliquity, must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence").
38. See Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1989); cf. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (hinting that preponderance is the appropriate burden of
proof); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F.2d 522, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting
that a RICO claim is not collaterally estopped by an adverse judgment on a common-law fraud
claim in state court, because of the lower burden of proof under RICO).
39. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV.
827, 832-37 (1987); Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 55 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 55, 78-84 (1986); Schanzle-Haskins, Opinion, RICO LITIGATION REP., Jan. 1985, at 1. See
generally Corrigan, supra note 4, at 2116.
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able only when there are one hundred or more victims and the action
can qualify as a class action pursuant to rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
40
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Subdivision (b)(3) of rule 23 allows an action to be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and "the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.""' The policy
considerations that have shaped the development of the law of rule
23(b)(3), as explained by the Advisory Committee, are very similar to
those which motivate preserving multiple-victim civil RICO actions
predicated on mail or wire fraud: continuing to allow these cases "would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity
of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.

'42

The Com-

mittee observed further that "a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons
by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation
for a class action. ...

Recent examples of the type of fraud-based RICO claims that
would be preserved include classes of ratepayers who were overcharged
by their electric utility,44 tenants in a huge apartment complex under-

going condominium conversion who were misled by the owners, 45 and
40.

This exception to the proposed deletions should be approved by the "consumers' lob-

bies." See 7B

C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER

& M. KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1782 (1986 &

Supp. 1988). This authority suggests:
A Rule 23(b)(3) action also may prove to be the most effective means of providing relief to the
consumer class .... The knowledge that aggrieved parties may act independently through
the courts to preserve their rights also could have a significant deterrent effect on businesses
that might engage in practices that are harmful to the consumer and contrary to public policies ....
Id. § 1782, at 56-57.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The rule guides the court's consideration of this inquiry by adding the following:
The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Id.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
43. Id.
44. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1428 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (approving class settlement); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (certifying class).
45. Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3236, afl'd,
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consumer purchasers who had been duped into agreeing to unfavorable
purchase financing."e Thus, an important advantage of the class approach is that it would build upon on a substantial body of well developed law.
C. Securities Fraud
Many authors have written about the impact of RICO on the private remedies available under the securities laws, and no attempt will
be made to duplicate those efforts here.47 Justice Thurgood Marshall
explained the problem in his dissent in Sedima4 8 in which three other
Justices joined. He observed that RICO
virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial development of private civil
remedies under the federal securities laws. Over the years, courts have paid close
attention to matters such as standing, culpability, causation, reliance, and materiality, as well as the definitions of "securities" and "fraud." All of this law is now an
endangered species because plaintiffs can avoid the limitations of the securities
laws merely by alleging violations of other predicate acts. 49

Furthermore, Congress has considered directly the appropriate remedy
for violation of the securities laws, and in section 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193450 it chose to limit such damages to actual damages. Daniel L. Goelzer, the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission, recently noted:
as Section 28(a) reflects, damages in excess of actual injury are unnecessary to accomplish the goals of the federal securities laws, and, indeed, may work at cross
purposes with such goals. The possibility of such liability can deter legitimate en893 F.2d 1433 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 539 (1989).
46. Heastie v. Community Bank, 125 F.R.D. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
47. See, e.g., ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 3, at 240 n.363.
48. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 505 (citation omitted). Justice Thurgood Marshall supplied several examples of
this "endangered species" law:
[E]ven in cases in which the investment instrument is not a "security" covered by the federal
securities laws, RICO will provide a treble-damages remedy to a plaintiff who can prove the
required pattern of mail or wire fraud. Before RICO, of course, the plaintiff could not have
recovered under federal law for the mail or wire fraud violation.
Similarly, a customer who refrained from selling a security during a period in which its
market value was declining could allege that, on two occasions, his broker recommended by
telephone, as part of a scheme to defraud, that the customer not sell the security. The customer might thereby prevail under civil RICO even though, as neither a purchaser nor a
seller, he would not have had standing to bring an action under the federal securities laws.
The effect of civil RICO on federal remedial schemes is not limited to the securities laws.
For example, even though commodities fraud is not a predicate offense listed in § 1961, the
carefully crafted private damages causes of action under the Commodity Exchange Act may
be circumvented in a commodities case through civil RICO actions alleging mail or wire fraud.
Id. at 505-06 (citations omitted). Of course, commodities fraud RICO actions, as in Panes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. IlM. 1980), cited by Justice Marshall, would be
precluded by eliminating mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).
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terprise, impede the raising of capital, and impose excessive litigation costs, costs
that inevitably are borne by consumers and investors. 51

There is simply no general need to encourage litigation for securities fraud as civil RICO does nor is there justification for shifting the
balance in such litigation as drastically in favor of a securities fraud
plaintiff as RICO does by threatening treble damages and attorney's
fees. Eliminating securities fraud from the list of predicate offenses
would restore the level playing field to securities litigation.
D. Civil RICO Cases Based on Other Predicate Offenses
I perceive no systematic misuse in the reported civil RICO actions
which are based on the other predicate offenses. A few recent cases illustrate my point:
- In a class action, customers sued a public utility for bribing members of a state regulatory body and thereby causing that body to approve excessive rates to be charged by the utility to its customers. The
RICO claims were predicated on a state bribery statute.2
- A women's health center brought an action against pro-life activists for repeated physical attacks on its premises, employees, and patients in an effort to force the center out of business. The predicate acts
were violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. section 1951, which relates
'5 3
to "[i]nterference with commerce by threats or violence.
- A small private bus company alleged that a union local had
threatened the bus company's property or employees in the course of a
labor organizing effort. The RICO claim was predicated on the threats
4
of violence.
Some commentators like to cite these types of cases as examples of
the overbreadth of civil RICO.5 5 But these are precisely the types of
cases that, with only slightly different facts, would enable civil recovery
by the victims of classic mobster behavior. These defendants did just
what would be expected from the mob; for example, if we substitute
1
51. Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (hearings not officially printed as of current date) (summary of
statement of Mr. Goelzer).
52. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2897 (1989). In a similar case, a
county sued a public utility for lying to the public rate commission to obtain higher rates. After a
jury verdict awarding $22.9 million in trebled damages to the county, the court granted the utility's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on rather vague state sovereignty grounds.
County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
53. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-50 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 261 (1989).
54. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
55. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 11 (referring to the abortion clinic and labor union
cases as examples of the "tremendous reach" of civil RICO).
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"sham pro-life activists employed by a rival clinic run by organized
crime" for "pro-life activists," or "mob-infiltrated union local" for
"union local," it is apparent that the acts the defendants committed in
those cases are exactly what RICO was crafted to target. Consequently,
there is no need to cut back on the use of predicate offenses other than
mail, wire, and securities fraud.
V.

OTHER PROPOSED REFORMS

Bills have been introduced to amend-and reform-RICO every
year in recent memory, and this year is no exception.5 6 Deletion of the
fraud predicate offenses is the crucial reform. After that deletion, civil
RICO will not require any other profound changes. Nonetheless, comments on some of the changes that have been proposed are included
below.
A.

Redacting "Racketeering"

No one, especially an accountant, wants to be called a racketeer:
"We are a profession that lives on its reputation. So if somebody runs
around impugning our integrity, we take that very seriously. You
shouldn't allow any ordinary citizen to jump up and scream,

'Racketeer!'

",57

Once mail, wire, and securities fraud have been removed as predicate offenses for civil RICO, thus removing routine business disputes
from the reach of the statute, there will be less perceived need to be rid
of the R-word. RICO should remain "RICO." One idea that seems altogether unworkable is, while leaving "racketeer" in the Act, prohibiting
the attorneys in civil actions from using that word in written or oral
58
presentations to the court.
B.

Automatic Treble Damages

Most proposed amendments of civil RICO restrict automatic treble
59
damages, costs, and attorney's fees to "government entity" plaintiffs
56. For some of the recent House efforts, see H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R.
4920, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 4923, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 3240, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); and H.R. 2983, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
57. Corrigan, supra note 4, at 2114 (quoting Theodore C. Barreaux, of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants).
58. See H.R. 1046, supra note 56, § 4 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(10)). For example, how
is RICO to be referred to? "This action is brought pursuant to the ********* Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ('*ICO') .... Under * ICO . ..."

59. A "government[al] entity" is the United States or a State, including any agency or department thereof, or a unit of local government (determined by its ability to (1) levy taxes and
spend funds, and (2) to exercise general corporate and police powers). See id. § 4 (proposed 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1)(A)).
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or predicate-offense-convicted defendants. This seems odd: government
entities do not need to be encouraged to bring litigation, and no benefit
to society arises from implicitly encouraging potential wrongdoers to redirect their racketeering activity away from government entities and toward private individuals."
Furthermore, the effect of the criminal conviction requirement
would be peculiar. Part of the reason treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees are provided is to encourage the bringing of civil actions that
might be difficult to win and which therefore might not otherwise be
brought. This usual justification is absent when a criminal conviction
has already been obtained. Because the civil RICO action requires proof
by only a preponderance of the evidence and the defendant already has
been proven guilty of the predicate offenses beyond a reasonable doubt,
these actions would seem to be nearly guaranteed winners. Besides, another function of civil RICO is to complement the efforts of prosecutors, which is hardly promoted by allowing automatic treble damages
and attorney's fees only after the prosecutors have done their work.
If, on the other hand, the idea behind a criminal conviction requirement is that treble damages and attorney's fees are appropriate
because the defendant has been proven guilty of the predicate offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt, then why not just allow automatic treble
damages and attorney's fees whenever the plaintiff can prove the predicate offenses to that level of certainty? Why should some plaintiffs,
equally injured, be able to recover less in damages just because their
defendants were not prosecuted for their crimes? Looking at it from the
other side, why should the miscreants who luckily have avoided prosecution for their crimes be blessed with the extra good fortune of freedom from treble damages and attorney's fees in a civil RICO action
brought by their wasted victims?
60. The care with which the legislative proposals preserve the ability of state and local governments to win treble damages under civil RICO is interesting. This preservation is the result of
intensive lobbying efforts by state attorneys general and municipal corporation counsels. See, e.g.,
Corrigan, supra note 4, at 2114 (quoting Steven Twist, chief assistant attorney general of Arizona).
Twist, who has been active in save-RICO efforts by the National Association of Attorneys General,
stated that "[t]he elimination of the triple damages remedy emasculates the statute." Id.; see also
Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (hearings not officially printed as of current date) (statement of Peter
L. Zimroth, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York) (noting that "ft]he City has been very
successful with RICO").
The state and local government lawyers have lobbied vigorously to preserve for themselves a
remedy in federal court, which they obviously find preferable to what their own legislatures have
provided. Thus, for example, this provision will preserve the ability of state tax officials to obtain
treble damages from state tax cheats under civil RICO, a remedy denied them by their own legislatures. See Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985) (predicate offense:
mail fraud).
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C. Double Punitive Damages
Another common feature of recent legislative proposals is to limit
RICO damages to actual damages upon proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, initially, and then to allow certain classes of plaintiffs to recover costs and attorney's fees. These favored plaintiffs also would be
granted punitive damages up to twice the amount of actual damages if
they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's
actions were reckless." Recent bills specially favor the plaintiff who is
(1) a unit of local government that is not a "government entity" or (2) a
natural person, tax-exempt organization, trust, pension fund, or investment company, and the injury is caused by insider trading, or (3) a
natural person or consumer and no remedy is available from securities
or commodities laws, or (4) a natural person who suffers serious bodily
injury by reason of a violent predicate offense.2
All of these machinations obviously are intended to exclude ordinary businesses from pursuing civil RICO actions. However, straining to
exclude ordinary business from treble damages and limiting most other
plaintiffs to only the possibility of double punitive damages ignores the
two-sided objective of treble damages: rewarding, and thus encouraging,
the pursuit of difficult litigation, and punishing, and thus deterring, the
perpetrators.
Nor is the manner in which this scheme roughly correlates remedy
with proof appropriate: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as determined
beforehand in a criminal trial, entitles the civil RICO plaintiff to automatic treble damages;63 proof of recklessness by clear and convincing
evidence makes the preferred plaintiff eligible for double punitive damages; 64 proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence provides only
actual damages. 6 5 This approach turns the traditional notion of damages on its head: it would no longer matter what the defendant had
done, but only how well the plaintiff could prove it.
The complicated mixing of burdens of proof with mens rea in these
61. See H.R. 1046, supra note 56, § 4 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(3)(D)). While previous
bills tended to employ the usual recklessness language-"conscious and wanton disregard of the
consequences," this year a completely new expression, not to be found in any federal case or statute, has arisen-"consciously malicious, or so egregious and deliberate that malice may be implied." Id. As a novel expression, this phrase certainly would lead lawyers to argue, and courts to
conclude, all quite reasonably, that Congress intended a meaning different from "conscious and
wanton disregard." Whatever the drafters mean by this new expression, they should endeavor to
make it clear in the statute and absolutely crystalline in the committee reports.
62. See id. § 4 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(2)(B)).
63. Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(5)).
64. Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(2)(C)).
65. See id. § 4 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)).
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proposals is another problem. 6 Most of the predicate acts are specific
intent crimes, such that the civil RICO plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant intentionally committed
the predicate offenses. Then, to qualify for punitive damages, the preferred plaintiff additionally must prove by a higher burden of proof,
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with a lesser
mens rea level, recklessness, in perpetrating the RICO pattern of predicate offenses. This sequence of proof and mens rea levels seems subtle
beyond meaning.
D. Statute of Limitations
Recent proposals have tended to provide a standard four year statute of limitations, or two years after a criminal conviction, or six years
for government entities, all tolled during the pendency of a government
civil or criminal action. A system of different limitations periods for
different plaintiffs is needlessly complex and reflects inappropriate priorities. The purpose of civil RICO is to encourage private victims to
enforce their rights against wrongdoers-so why give preferential treatment to government entities, which are far better equipped to discover
wrongdoing and muster the resources to pursue litigation to recover for
it than are private parties? The extra two years after a conviction are
also superfluous: why particularly facilitate those civil actions?
The statute of limitations for civil RICO actions should be that of
the last predicate offense. The standard federal criminal limitations period is five years," and shortening the period vis-a-vis ordinary plaintiffs and lengthening it for governmental plaintiffs, and lengthening it
even further after a criminal conviction, is unjustified. None of the purposes of having a limitations period is furthered by having different periods for different plaintiffs.
E.

Universal Service of Process

The recent reform bills extend the reach of service of process in
civil RICO actions, beyond "any judicial district of the United States"
to "anywhere. ' 69 Such a provision for service of process does not comport with due process constraints on the ability of a federal court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign parties. Rather than forcing
the courts to deal with this issue ab initio, Congress should make explicit its intent in this regard.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(6)).
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988).
See H.R. 1046, supra note 56, § 5.
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F. Affirmative Defense
Recent bills have introduced an affirmative defense of good faith
reliance on governmental action.70 No such defense is needed or desirable, because whether good faith reliance is an adequate defense is a
question to be resolved with regard to each predicate offense. If, under
the established law controlling the predicate offenses at issue in a particular case, a defendant is denied good faith reliance as an affirmative
defense, that denial should resolve the issue for the RICO claim as well.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The problem with civil RICO is generally well understood: too
many commonplace commercial disputes are brought as civil RICO actions in federal court. And it is a problem with a simple solution: delete
mail, wire, and securities fraud as predicate offenses, except in large
class actions.
This is a straightforward, easily accomplished solution that goes to
the core of the problem. The solutions thus far proposed by Congress go
too far and gut civil RICO or create new problems that will require yet
another round of motions, decisions, and appeals in an already overRICOed court system.

70.

See id. § 4 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(7)).

